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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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7 results foundAuthor: Dandurand, Yvon Title: Confident Policing in a Troubled Community: Evaluation of the Vancouver Police Department's City-wide Enforcement Team Initiative: A Report prepared for the City of VAncouver and the Vancouver Agreement Coordination Unit Summary: This evaluation, sponsored by the Vancouver Agreement Coordination Unit, was designed to assess the impact of the Vancouver Police Department’s City-Wide Enforcement Team (CET) initiative implemented in the Downtown Eastside (DTES) area of the city during the during the months of April-September, 2003. The CET followed a number of previous police interventions in the area that targeted the drug trade and was initiated after a planning process that included an unsuccessful attempt to secure additional fiscal support from the City Council. The CET had three primary objectives: 1) to bring order to a disordered community; 2) to disrupt the open drug market; and, 3) to disrupt the flow of stolen property into the DTES. These objectives were to be achieved by providing an enhanced police presence in the area in an attempt to disperse drug dealers and their user-clients and, in doing so, reduce the levels of disorder and increase safety and security in the area. The CET represented a dramatic departure from the previous “containment” approach wherein policing services were provided to the DTES on a primarily reactive basis. Senior police personnel viewed the initiative as a long-delayed fulfillment of their legislated mandate to provide full policing services to the residents of the DTES. To assess the effectiveness of the CET, in-depth interviews were conducted community residents, business owners, incarcerated offenders, health care professionals, the police officers who were assigned to the DTES at the time the CET was implemented, and IV drug users. In addition, systematic field observations were conducted in the DTES during a three month period and focus group sessions were conducted with community residents, persons involved in the delivery of social services, sex trade workers, and members of NGOs in the DTES. Statistical information from the Vancouver Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch system (CAD), the PRIME record system, the pawnshop data base, as well as from other agencies, including Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services, B.C. Ambulance Service, the Coroner’s Office, and hospital admission data were retrieved and analyzed. The results of the analysis indicate that the CET was successful in disrupting the open drug market, reducing the general levels of social disorder, and enhancing the general feelings of safety and security among persons who live and work in the DTES. The CET was less successful in pursuing drug dealers and the associated criminal activity that was displaced into other areas in District 2 and into adjacent police districts. There is some evidence that the drug market in the DTES adapted to the increased police presence, becoming more orderly, dispersed and moving out of the public realm into private locations. The price and availability of drugs in the area were not significantly impacted. Drug dealers and their clients who were displaced to other areas created localized crime “hot spots” of drug dealing and associated disorder, although this occurred in the context of overall declines in drug and public disorder offences in all police districts in the city during the last nine months of 2003 as compared with the same time period in 2002. With respect to potential detrimental effects of the initiative, there is no evidence that the CET had a measurable impact on the number of fatal drug overdoses in the DTES or adversely affected IV drug users with respect to their access to HIV prevention, needle exchange and other services. Nor is there evidence that the risk behaviour of IV drug users was influenced by the CET initiative in a way that noticeably increased public health risks. The data that were gathered for the evaluation did not allow a determination of whether the CET was successful in interfering with the flow of stolen property into the DTES, although the stolen property market was forced to become more discrete and more of the stolen property may have been fenced out of the immediate DTES area. Police officers, community residents, IV drug users, and others who offered an opinion on the subject shared the view that the stolen property market had not been significantly reduced. Senior police personnel, based on their observations, believed that the flow of stolen property as it existed prior to the CET had been impacted and cited the Extract data to support their view that the quality and value of stolen goods flowing into the DTES had declined. The attempt by the project team to assess the impact of the CET on the stolen property market in the DTES was hindered by methodological difficulties. There was general support among community residents, business owners, sex trade workers, and IV drug users for the increased police presence in the area and with the performance of the police. There was also an expressed desire that the police enhance their relations with the community through expanded foot patrols and increased training to better equip officers to effectively police the area. Some concern was expressed about the policing styles of some officers assigned to the area. Residents were divided as to whether the overall quality of life in the community had improved, although their overall feelings of safety and security had increased. The effectiveness of the CET was compromised to some extent by insufficient coordination and joint planning with other agencies and organizations in the DTES, a lack of departmental resources, and by some inconsistency in the policing strategies used by officers in the DTES. The results of the study also indicated that the CET would have benefited from a comprehensive communication strategy to increase the awareness of community residents and business owners and others involved in the delivery of services in the area. A major limitation of this evaluation is that the survey interview data were gathered six months after the CET initiative was implemented and it can be expected that this short time frame is sufficient only to capture certain facets of any changes in community life in the DTES. It is difficult to determine the extent to which medium and long-term changes are occurring and whether these changes are permanent or ephemeral. It is also unrealistic to expect that the dynamics of life in a community, where crime and disorder had become deeply entrenched, would be significantly and measurably altered in six months as a consequence of one initiative such as the CET. It can be expected that the dynamics of life in the DTES will continue to evolve and that specific initiatives, such as the CET, will evolve as well. The special initiative did serve a number of purposes, one of which was for the VPD, as an organization, to accept and acknowledge its responsibility to challenge its own long-standing policy of “containment” and to move proactively to provide effective policing services to the DTES community and to attempt to improve the overall quality of life for all of its residents. Details: Abbotsford, BC: University College of the Fraser Valley, 2004. 251p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.vancouveragreement.ca/wp-content/uploads/ConfidentPolicing2004sm.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Canada URL: http://www.vancouveragreement.ca/wp-content/uploads/ConfidentPolicing2004sm.pdf Shelf Number: 120152 Keywords: DisplacementDrug DealersDrug EnforcementOpen-Air Drug MarketsPolice-Community RelationsPolicing (Vancouver, Canada)Public DisorderStolen Goods |
Author: Latypov, Alisher Title: Drug Dealers, Drug Lords and Drug Warriors-cum-Traffickers: Drug Crime and the Narcotics Market in Tajikistan Summary: This report presents research on the role played by the police, petty drug dealers and users in the street level drug trade in Tajikistan. Synthesizing information received from interviews with individual Tajik drug users, annual reports from the Tajik Drug Control Agency as well as lesser- known studies by local researchers, the study brings to light a number of interesting details of the street level drug trade in Tajikistan and discusses their implications for drug policies in the region as a whole. The main findings are: 1. the drug trade is evolving and becoming more mobile whereby cellular communications are used to arrange meetings or direct delivery of drugs to one’s home by the dealer in lieu of the previous practice of using specially-designated apartments or homes for the sale/purchase of drugs; 2.there is an emerging tendency amongst dealers to have purchasers transfer money to their bank accounts to facilitate larger drug sales; 3.heroin in Tajikistan is now more widely available, easier to acquire and of higher quality – all of which is consistent with changes in the prices of high purity heroin in the country in recent years; 4.the current situation in those towns bordering Afghanistan indicates a strong correlation between HIV risk behaviors and expanding HIV epidemics among injecting drug users; 5.new types of drugs like pill-form methadone from Iran and cocaine and ecstasy from China and Russia are available on the drug markets in Tajikistan, with the latter becoming especially popular in night clubs frequented by Tajik youth; 6.the Tajik drug market is being connected to drug markets in other countries through new routes between Tajikistan and China, with drugs moving in both directions, and Tajikistan and Iran. This research likewise illustrates the shocking state of corruption in Tajik law enforcement agencies and penitentiary facilities whereby police and prison officers directly facilitate the distribution of drugs. Law enforcement officials provide (confiscated) heroin to favored dealers, arrest or harass competing dealers and exploit drug users in various ways for the sake of information, money or sexual favors. Drug users are also routinely arrested, often by planting evidence on them, to meet arbitrary quotas, which all but ensures that the activities of larger criminal and drug trafficking organizations will go on unimpeded. Moreover, while the analysis of data from the Tajik Drug Control Agency suggests that the volume of opiates coming to or transiting Tajikistan from Afghanistan might, on the whole, have diminished over the past few years, the reported decrease in opiate seizures appears to be misleading as corruption in law enforcement has kept the country awash in heroin and other drugs. To address these challenges, this study suggests stepping up state prosecution of corrupt police and corrections officers, re-visiting contemporary drug policies through the lens of human rights, introducing policies that discourage targeting and arresting drug users for the purpose of police performance assessment, and providing more harm reduction, drug treatment and legal aid opportunities to people who use drugs both in community and prison settings. Details: Vilnius, Lithuania: Eurasian Harm Reduction Network, 2011. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 23, 2012 at http://idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Drug_warriors_in_Takijistan_0.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Tajikistan URL: http://idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Drug_warriors_in_Takijistan_0.pdf Shelf Number: 123749 Keywords: Drug DealersDrug PoliciesDrug Trade (Tajikistan)Drug Trafficking (Tajikistan)HeroinIllegal Drug TradeOpiatesPolice Corruption |
Author: Human Rights Foundation of Monland-Burma Title: Bitter Pills: Breaking the Silence Surrounding Drug Problems in the Mon Community Summary: In late 2012 the New Mon State Party (NMSP) initiated a vigorous anti-drugs campaign throughout various Mon communities in Burma. Arrests of numerous drug smugglers were made, drug-using youth were sent to NMSP rehabilitation centres, and signs were erected in villages calling on residents to resist and combat drug use. This wave of action brought an issue to the table that had thus far been surrounded by silence from relevant authorities. Prior to this, domestic and international discussions of Burma’s drug problems had largely been restricted to regions in Upper Burma, in particular Shan State. However, NMSP action highlighted that drugs were also prevalent in Mon communities and were being abused by Mon youth. With a new focus on this issue, various questions have been raised. Exactly how widespread is the problem? Where are these drugs coming from? What are authorities outside of the NMSP doing to tackle drug use and trading? So far, these and other queries have been met with few adequate responses. The main purpose of this report is to take on some of these questions and begin the process of providing concerned parties with satisfactory answers. Using testimony from a range of sources, HURFOM aims to offer a preliminary account of drug use and trading in Mon communities. The report also serves as a call to action to various authorities, whose co-operation is needed if decisive action is to be taken. Now that the matter has been brought to the table by the NMSP, HURFOM aims to ensure that authorities do not fall back into a pattern of silence and inactivity. We entreat all authorities, in particular the Burmese government and ethnic armed groups, to follow the lead taken by the NMSP and take up the challenge of tackling drug use in their domains of authority. Details: Kanchanaburi, Thailand: Human Rights Foundation of Monland-Burma (HURFOM), 2013. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: http://rehmonnya.org/upload/Bitterpills.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Burma URL: http://rehmonnya.org/upload/Bitterpills.pdf Shelf Number: 129204 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction (Burma)Drug DealersDrug OffendersDrug Trafficking |
Author: Aldridge, Judith Title: Not an 'Ebay for Drugs': The Cryptomarket 'Silk Road' as a Paradigm Shifting Criminal Innovation Summary: The online cryptomarket Silk Road has been oft-characterised as an 'eBay for drugs' with customers drug consumers making personal use-sized purchases. Our research demonstrates that this was not the case. Using a bespoke web crawler, we downloaded all drugs listings on Silk Road in September 2013. We found that a substantial proportion of transactions on Silk Road are best characterised as 'business-to-business', with sales in quantities and at prices typical of purchases made by drug dealers sourcing stock. High price-quantity sales generated between 31-45% of revenue, making sales to drug dealers the key Silk Road drugs business. As such, Silk Road was what we refer to as a transformative, as opposed to incremental, criminal innovation. With the key Silk Road customers actually drug dealers sourcing stock for local street operations, we were witnessing a new breed of retail drug dealer, equipped with a technological subcultural capital skill set for sourcing stock. Sales on Silk Road increased from an estimate of $14.4 million in mid 2012 to $89. million by our calculations. This is a more than 600% increase in just over a year, demonstrating the demand for this kind of illicit online marketplace. With Silk Road functioning to considerable degree at the wholesale/broker market level, its virtual location should reduce violence, intimidation and territorialism. Results are discussed in terms of the opportunities cryptomarkets provide for criminologists, who have thus far been reluctant to step outside of social surveys and administrative data to access the world of 'webometric' and 'big data'. Details: Unpublished paper, 2014. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2014 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436643 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436643 Shelf Number: 132582 Keywords: Drug DealersDrug MarketsDrug OffendersOnline Communications |
Author: Vazquez, Pedro Title: Residents' Feelings and Interpretation of the Open-Air Drug Market in Conkey and Clifford Neighborhood of Rochester, New York Summary: Low-level drug dealers thrive where they do not conflict with legitimate businesses, but rather support and are supported by certain elements of their environment (Thomas J. Charron, Debra Whitcomb, & George Ross, 2004, pg. 3). According to T. Charron, D. Whitcomb, & G. Ross (2004), dimly lit parking lots, alleys, abandoned buildings, bars, and roads that allow drivers to slow down or stop are some of the elements of the environment that support low-level drug dealers. Low-level drug dealing in open-air markets generates or contributes to a wide range of social disorder and drug-related crime in the surrounding neighborhood that can also have an effect on the residents' quality of life (Alex Harocopos & Mike Hough, 2005). The purpose of this paper is to gain an understanding of how residents in the Conkey and Clifford neighborhood in Rochester, New York have been affected by the open-air marijuana market, as well as their view of their neighborhood. The Rochester Drug Free Street Initiative (RDFSI) coalition has been working with residents in the Conkey and Clifford neighborhood to bring to an end the marketing of low-level drugs in their neighborhood. The RDFSI is implementing two approaches, which is led by Ibero-American Development Corporation (IADC), the H.O.P.E project and other committed local partners. The intervention, which is known as INSPIRE (Invested, Neighbors, Seeking, Progress, Inspiration, Restoration, & Empowerment), is being run by RDFSI staff and community members. The RDFSI is applying the two civil approaches to a two- tiered strategy. First is the Restorative Practices Strategy: working with PiRI (Partners in Restorative Initiatives,) neighborhood residents, and other community providers. RDFSI created what is being known as "Restorative Community Circles"; here people who are currently selling marijuana on the street can meet with other community members who want to help them transition into productive community members. This process creates a safe space for those who inform dealers how drug sales are affecting them and their families. The second strategy involves a stay-away order. RDFSI staff knows that not all dealers will be receptive to the restorative community circle process, but residents still need to be protected from those who continue to sell marijuana in their neighborhoods. The order will assist in interrupting the sale of marijuana by extricating the dealers from their geographical market. Residents have asked, "Why haven't the police done anything about drug dealers?" Police officers have a hard task when it comes to arresting low-level drug dealers. Marijuana has been decriminalized in New York State, which means that any individual found with less than an ounce of marijuana will not be arrested, charged, or face any jail time. These individual will only face a violation, which is punishable by a fine of $25.00 or less. Parking on the wrong side of the street is a much more serious violation than that of a violation for marijuana possession of less than an ounce, as alternate parking fines are $50.00 in the City. This is why police officers have limited power in handling the issues of open-air drug markets. This paper will highlight the answers to the survey conducted by RDFSI during the Rochester T.I.P.S event. Project T.I.P.S stand for Trust, Information, Programs & Services, the projects includes community agencies and law enforcement personnel working together in a selected neighborhood to rebuild trust amongst residents and share information. The answers to the "Your Voice" survey, which was construed by CPSI (Center for Public Safety Imitative) student researcher. This survey was giving to residents who are involved with RDFSI, and the information from the resident's focus group conducted by the RDFSI. Details: Rochester, NY: Center for Public Safety Initiatives Rochester Institute of Technology, 2014. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2015 at: https://www.rit.edu/cla/criminaljustice/sites/rit.edu.cla.criminaljustice/files/docs/WorkingPapers/2014/Conkey%20and%20Clifford%20Resident%20Surveys%20-%20MJ%20Market%20-%20WEBSITE%20VERSION.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.rit.edu/cla/criminaljustice/sites/rit.edu.cla.criminaljustice/files/docs/WorkingPapers/2014/Conkey%20and%20Clifford%20Resident%20Surveys%20-%20MJ%20Market%20-%20WEBSITE%20VERSION.pdf Shelf Number: 135328 Keywords: Drug DealersDrug DealingDrug MarketsDrug OffendersDrugs and Crime |
Author: Munoz-Herrera, Manual Title: Drug Dealing In Bucaramanga: Case Study In A Drug Producing Country Summary: We present a case study of the market of drug dealing in the context of a drug producing country. A main characteristic of a drug producing country is that illegal drugs are more accessible and have dramatically lower prices in the street market compared to countries that do not produce drugs. We locate our study to the city of Bucaramanga, Colombia; the country with the largest production of cocaine in the world. We make use of two sources of primary information (i) direct interviews to drug dealers, and (ii) media analysis of the local newspaper. Our main finding is that individual dealers exchange drugs, without any incentives to integrate and take control of the distribution in the city. That is, the low prices of drugs reduce profit and deter dealers to fight for monopoly, leading to a decentralized market of multiple uni-personal firms who use no violence. Details: Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2014. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 58523: Accessed December 7, 2016 at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58523/1/MPRA_paper_58523.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58523/1/MPRA_paper_58523.pdf Shelf Number: 147951 Keywords: CocaineDrug DealersDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence |
Author: Drug Policy Alliance Title: An Overdose Death is Not a Murder: Why Drug-Induced Homicide Laws are Counterproductive and Inhumane Summary: The country is in the middle of a tragic increase in drug overdose deaths. Countless lives have been lost - each one leaving an irreparable rift in the hearts and lives of their families and friends. These tragedies are best honored by implementing evidence-based solutions that help individuals, families, and communities heal and that prevent additional avoidable deaths. This report examines one strategy that the evidence suggests is intensifying, rather than helping, the problem and calls for leaders to turn towards proven measures to address the increasing rates of overdose deaths. In the 1980s, at the height of the draconian war on drugs, the federal government and a host of states passed "drug-induced homicide" laws intended to punish people who sold drugs that led to accidental overdose deaths with sentences equivalent to those for manslaughter and murder. For the first 15-20 years, these laws were rarely used by police or prosecutors, but steadily increasing rates of drug overdose deaths across the country have led the law enforcement community to revive them. Currently, 20 states - Delaware, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming - have drug-induced homicide laws on the books. A number of other states, while without specific drug-induced homicide statutes, still charge the offense of drug delivery resulting in death under various felony-murder, depraved heart, or involuntary or voluntary manslaughter laws. These laws and prosecutions have proliferated despite the absence of any evidence of their effectiveness in reducing drug use or sales or preventing overdose deaths. In fact, as this report illustrates, these efforts exacerbate the very problem they seek to remediate by discouraging people who use drugs from seeking help and assistance. Although data are unavailable on the number of people being prosecuted under these laws, media mentions of drug-induced homicide prosecutions have increased substantially over the last six years. In 2011, there were 363 news articles about individuals being charged with or prosecuted for drug-induced homicide, increasing over 300 percent to 1,178 in 2016. Based on press mentions, use of drug-induced homicide laws varies widely from state to state. Since 2011, midwestern states Wisconsin, Ohio, Illinois, and Minnesota have been the most aggressive in prosecuting drug-induced homicides, with northeastern states Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York and southern states Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee rapidly expanding their use of these laws. Further signaling a return to failed drug war tactics, in 2017 alone, elected officials in at least 13 states - Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia - introduced bills to create new drug-induced homicide offenses or strengthen existing drug-induced homicide laws. Prosecutors and legislators who champion renewed drug-induced homicide enforcement couch the use of this punitive measure, either naively or disingenuously, as necessary to curb increasing rates of drug overdose deaths. But there is not a shred of evidence that these laws are effective at reducing overdose fatalities. In fact, death tolls continue to climb across the country, even in the states and counties most aggressively prosecuting drug-induced homicide cases. As just one example, despite ten full-time police officers investigating 53 potential drug-induced homicide cases in Hamilton County, Ohio in 2015, the county still recorded 100 more opioid-related overdose deaths in 2016 than in 2015. This should be unsurprising. Though the stated rationale of prosecutors and legislators throughout the country is that harsh penalties like those associated with drug-induced homicide laws will deter drug selling, and, as a result, will reduce drug use and related harms like overdose, we have heard this story before. Drug war proponents have been repeating the deterrence mantra for over 40 years, and yet drugs are cheaper, stronger, and more widely available than at any other time in US history. Supply follows demand, so the supply chain for illegal substances is not eliminated because a single seller is incarcerated, whether for drug-induced homicide or otherwise. Rather, the only effect of imprisoning a drug seller is to open the market for another one. Research consistently shows that neither increased arrests nor increased severity of criminal punishment for drug law violations results in less use (demand) or sales (supply). In other words, punitive sentences for drug offenses have no deterrent effect. Unfortunately, the only behavior that is deterred by drug-induced homicide prosecutions is the seeking of life-saving medical assistance. Increasing, and wholly preventable, overdose fatalities are an expected by-product of drug-induced homicide law enforcement. The most common reason people cite for not calling 911 in the event of an overdose is fear of police involvement. Recognizing this barrier, 40 states and the District of Columbia have passed "911 Good Samaritan" laws, which provide, in varying degrees, limited criminal immunity for drug-related offenses for those who seek medical assistance for an overdose victim. This public health approach to problematic drug use, however, is rendered useless by enforcement of drug-induced homicide laws. People positioned to save lives are unlikely to call 911 if they fear being charged with murder or manslaughter. Jennifer Marie Johnson called 911 when her husband overdosed after she gave him methadone; she is currently serving six years in Minnesota prison for drug-induced homicide. Erik Scott Brown received an enhanced sentence of 23 years in federal prison partly because he failed to call 911 after a friend, whom he had supplied with one tenth of a gram of heroin, fatally overdosed. According to his testimony, the reason he did not call 911 was because drugs were present at the scene. Prosecutors - by their own admissions - want to make "examples" of these types of cases. But elevating punishments for drug-induced homicide charges has a chilling effect on seeking medical assistance and, as a result, leads to more, not fewer, avoidable overdose fatalities. This is especially true when police and prosecutors widely abuse their discretion in investigating and prosecuting drug-induced homicide cases. The vast majority of charges are sought against those in the best positions to seek medical assistance for overdose victims - family, friends, acquaintances, and people who sell small amounts of drugs, often to support their own drug addiction. Despite police and prosecutor promises to go after upper echelon drug manufacturers and distributors, that rarely happens. Out of the 32 drug-induced homicide prosecutions identified by the New Jersey Law Journal in the early 2000s, 25 involved prosecution of friends of the decedent who did not sell drugs in any significant manner. After analyzing the 100 most recent cases of drug-induced homicide in southeastern Wisconsin (as of February 2017), Wisconsin's Fox6 reported that nearly 90 percent of those charged were friends or relatives of the person who died, or the lowest people in the drug supply chain, who were often selling to support their own substance use disorder. A Chicago Tribune review of drug-induced homicide cases between 2011 and 2014 in various Illinois counties showed that the defendant was typically the last person who was with the person who overdosed. Law enforcement must be held accountable for this appalling misuse of discretion; particularly when it discourages the seeking of medical care and wastes resources that could otherwise be spent on interventions that have actually been proven successful at reducing overdose deaths. Unchecked police and prosecutorial discretion in drug-induced homicide cases is particularly ominous given the severity of sentences and the racist history of drug war enforcement. Although rates of drug use and selling are comparable across racial lines, black and Latino people are far more likely to be stopped, searched, arrested, prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated for drug law violations than are white people. When, in response to the overdose crisis, Maine Governor Paul Le Page states that "black dealers" and "guys with the name D-Money, Smoothie, Shifty" are the root of the problem by bringing drugs from places like Brooklyn into his rural state, he lays it bare. Most elected officials and prosecutors advocating a punishment-oriented approach to a public health crisis are more careful with their language than Le Page - targeting "pushers" and "those people" - but the implication is the same. Enforcement of drug war policies has historically targeted black and Latino communities, and drug-induced homicide prosecutions appear to follow this pattern. While comprehensive data are not available, the district attorney of one predominantly white suburban county in Illinois with a black population of only 1.6 percent has charged four black men from Chicago with drug-induced homicide (making up 35 percent of the total prosecutions), and one prosecutor in Minnesota appears to have charged predominately black people with drug-induced homicide. Though we cannot draw any conclusions from these sparse facts, if law enforcement utilizes drug-induced homicide like it has other tools of the drug war, we can reasonably expect that the result will be future cases like James Linder's, a black man from Chicago who is serving 28 years in federal prison after being sentenced by an all-white jury in rural Illinois. Unfortunately, the harms of a highly punitive response to drug use and sales expand far beyond the effects of the actual punishment. Indeed, criminalizing people who sell and use drugs, through means like drug-induced homicide charges, amplifies the risk of fatal overdoses and diseases by increasing stigma and marginalization and driving people away from needed medical care, treatment, and harm reduction services. On the other hand, proven strategies are available to reduce the harms associated with drug misuse, treat dependence and addiction, improve immediate overdose responses, enhance public safety, and prevent fatalities. These strategies include expanding access to the life-saving medicine naloxone and training in how to administer it; enacting and implementing legal protections that encourage people to call for medical help for overdose victims; training people how to prevent, recognize, and respond to an overdose; increasing access to opioid agonist treatment such as methadone and buprenorphine, and to other effective, non-coercive drug treatments; authorizing drug checking and safe consumption sites; and improving research on promising drug treatments. Each of these strategies has evidence to support its effectiveness. Drug-induced homicide laws have none. They have not proven successful at either reducing overdose deaths or curtailing the use or sale of illegal drugs. And yet, ironically, prosecutors and legislators wield this punitive sword with impunity. They are not required to show results in support of their faulty rationale, and they are not held accountable for utterly wasted resources. We simply cannot let our elected officials off the hook that easily anymore. Not when it could be your child, friend or, simply, fellow human being, who dies from a drug overdose or is locked up for murder due to our elected officials' failures to embrace proven, life-saving public health interventions in favor of wasteful, destructive punishments. Details: Washington, DC: Drug Policy Alliance, 2017. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2019 at: https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dpa_drug_induced_homicide_report_0.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.drugpolicy.org/resource/DIH Shelf Number: 154109 Keywords: 911 Good Samaritan LawsDrug DealersDrug Overdose DeathDrug War PoliciesDrug-Induced Homicide Evidence-Based SolutionsOpioidsProsecutorial DiscretionPublic Health Approach |